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NOTES
THE PRIZE AND THE PRICE OF INDIVIDUAL
AGENCY: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON
ABORTION AND LIBERAL
GOVERNMENT*
In the wake of the recent Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Re-
productive Health Services, 1 Americans likely face yet another prolonged
political clash over the abortion issue. The dilemmas raised by unwanted
pregnancies involve fundamental questions about the nature of American
government and society, questions which the Supreme Court, state legis-
latures, and voters must again address. For example, what are the goals
of the United States as a political community? What is the status of an
individual in that community? What kinds of harm must the law pre-
vent? And who may define a "harm"? With an eye to the political up-
heaval2 surrounding the Supreme Court's recent abortion decision, this
Note revisits the question whether political power should be used to pre-
vent abortion.
* This Note follows a year and a half of serious study and several revolutions in my thinking
about abortion and government. I spent the spring of 1989 involved in the Duke Students For Life,
a pro-life group. My first paper, "Abortion and the Sovereignty of the People," took the extreme
position that all fundamental rights derive from super-majority consent, and that no right, including
the professed right to abortion, will be protected as fundamental until that consent is secured. The
paper is published as a runnerup essay in the Sidney Lewine Essay Contest in HEALTH MATRIX,
Summer 1989, at 53. After educating myself about natural rights philosophy and the United States'
tradition of judicial review, I wrote a second paper, "The Responsibilities of Government Regarding
Abortion," for Professors Ruth Grant and John Aldrich at Duke University. Relying on John
Locke's theory of government as Judge when individual shortsightedness and partiality prevent just
individual judgments, I took the position in that paper that government must ensure due weight is
given to the fetus' life when abortion is considered-"due weight" meaning that abortion usually is
not justified and usually should not be allowed. Still uncomfortable with advocating the use of
coercive political power on the question, I delved further and came to the position presented in this
Note.
1. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (Missouri's prohibition on use of public facilities or employees for
abortion upheld; test for viability requirement also upheld). The opinions of both Justice Blackmun,
dissenting, and Justice O' Connor, concurring, foreshadow the continued debate on abortion. Justice
Blackmun says: "For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their desti-
nies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows." Id. at 3079 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor explains her limited concurrence saying, "Where will be time
enough to reexamine Roe. And to do so carefully." Id. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2. See Ted Gest, The Abortion Furor, U.S. News & World Report, July 17, 1989, at 18; Mer-
rill McLoughlin, America's New Civil War, U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 3, 1988, at 23.
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Pro-life activists make the critical assumption that a fetus is a devel-
oping human life and, therefore, attempts to destroy it ought to be force-
fully prevented. 3 Pro-choice activists make the equally critical, contrary
assumption that even if a fetus is a developing human life, the political
community should not value it the same as a born human being for pur-
poses of forceful protection.4 Although this fundamental conflict cannot
be resolved through a single point of view, both sides of the debate could
benefit by considering more seriously the methods and purposes of moral
and political power.5 Sensitivity to the difference between moral and
political power may lead to more common ground than has appeared
possible in the past--even, perhaps, to the opportunity for a peaceful
political consensus in the face of deep moral disagreements.
This Note addresses the difference between moral and political
power primarily from the vantage point of political theory. The Note
maintains that the decision to have an abortion is an immoral rejection of
a voluntarily acquired responsibility to nourish the fetus, and that abor-
tions should be opposed with all the methods of moral power. ("Volunta-
rily acquired" excludes a pregnancy resulting from rape or incest.)
However, because of the importance of moral and religious commitments
in the perception of a responsibility to nourish the fetus, individuals
should not be coerced by political power to fulfill that responsibility.
For purposes of this Note, "political power" includes the use of
physical and economic punishments or constraints to coerce conduct.6
"Moral power" operates by example, reasoning and persuasion but leaves
3. BERNARD NATHANSON, ABORTING AMERICA 259-60 (1979); McLoughlin, supra note 2, at
27; Mary Meehan, More Trouble Than They're Worth? Children and Abortion, in ABORTION: UN-
DERSTANDING DIFFERENCES 145, 146-48 (S. Callahan & D. Callahan eds. 1984).
4. Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Meaning of Life, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIp-
FERENCES, supra note 3, at 25, 42; McLoughlin, supra note 2, at 25, 27.
For the purposes of this Note, I compare only two categories of human life-fetuses and born
human beings. I do not discuss the important question at what point from conception to birth
government should begin protecting life with political power. The Supreme Court presently allows,
but does not require, coercive protection of fetal life after the point of viability when the fetus "pre-
sumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973).
5. The idea that the legality and morality of abortion are distinct issues is an argument usually
made to support a pro-choice political position in combination with varying degrees of moral con-
demnation of abortion. See ROSALIND PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE
STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 348-49 (1985) ("[W]e need to distinguish be-
tween the political question-who should decide-and the moral question-whether abortion is right
or wrong in a given instance."); Mary Mahowald, Abortion and Equality, in ABORTION: UNDER-
STANDING DIFFERENCES, supra note 3, at 177, 178 (noting that some "approve of the legality but
not the morality of abortion"); Mary Segers, Abortion and the Culture: Toward a Feminist Perspec-
tive, in id at 229, 233 ("fact that abortion is legal is not held to be conclusive of its morality").
6. John Locke contemplated a similar meaning of political power in his SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT § 3 (C. Macpherson ed. 1980): "Politicalpower, then, I take to be a right of making
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individuals free to act according to their own choices. "Political commu-
nity" is a community that maintains its bonds by political power and
consequently serves a limited purpose among the people or society gener-
ally.7 "Society" includes the political community as well as communities
bound together by common interests and commitments not appropri-
ately coerced by political power. "Individual agency," or "individual lib-
erty," refers to the right of individuals to govern themselves-to be the
final judges of when and how to act on a particular matter.
Part I of this Note explores the capacity for individual agency as the
foundation for the separation of moral and political power.8 The first
Part concludes, as did the Framers of the Constitution, that existence of
this capacity requires respect for individual agency, even if many individ-
uals do not use their liberty to develop morally good actions and atti-
tudes.9 Proper respect for individual agency sometimes requires restraint
in the use of political power in favor of moral power.
The Note emphasizes that the goal of moral power need not be
moral relativity or appreciation for diversity on all matters calling for
political restraint. One can distinguish meaningfully between right and
wrong on issues such as abortion, while recognizing that the responsibil-
ity to do right, and the responsibility for both personal and social conse-
quences of right or wrong conduct, lies with the individual.10
Part II discusses the difficulty of judging whether moral or political
power should be used to enforce right conduct on the abortion issue. The
desire to protect the fetus and to maintain consistency in the political
community's treatment of human life leads to the conclusion that polit-
ical power should be used. However, the importance of individual reli-
gious and moral commitments in valuing the fetus relative to other
values implies that moral power, not political power, should be used.1
Further, because forbidding abortion does much more than prevent
harm-it also coerces substantial sacrifices from pregnant women- the
use of moral power is more appropriate than the use of political power.' 2
Finally, the Note argues that full individual responsibility for family and
sexual relations requires the exclusive use of moral power, although al-
laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties... and of employing the force of the
community... and all this only for the public good."
7. Locke articulates this meaning of political community. Id. §§ 126-31; see also Ruth Grant,
Locke's Political Anthropology and Lockean Individualism, 50 J. OF POLITIcS 42, 51 (1988).
8. See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 46-65 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 66-106 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
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lowing for individual responsibility on the abortion question also allows
some adults to settle for less in their moral commitments.1 3
Since Roe v. Wade, state legislatures have not been allowed to use
political power to coerce individuals in the abortion decision. In Roe, the
Supreme Court determined that pregnant women, in consultation with
their doctors, should be the final judges of how to act when faced with an
unwanted pregnancy. 14 State legislatures cannot infringe individual
agency15 on the question until a fetus is viable, although a state can regu-
late the abortion procedure in the interest of the mother's health prior to
viability.1 6
In a recent case, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, several
Justices-namely Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy,
and Scalia-express discomfort with the level of protection Roe grants to
individual agency at the expense of the democratic process.17 Although
they would not prevent a state from protecting individual agency on the
abortion question, they also would not prevent a state from protecting
fetal life with political power, at the expense of individual agency. These
Justices believe that the values of life and liberty at stake in the abortion
dilemma should be balanced in the democratic process. A legislative ma-
jority should decide which value is paramount and to what extent.
Most of this Note advocates a negative answer to the question
whether political power should be used to prevent abortion, without sug-
gesting which government institution should answer that question. The
discussion about the use of political power applies to state legislatures as
much as to the Supreme Court. However, the Note's conclusion briefly
13. See infra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
14. 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
15. The Supreme Court uses the label "right of privacy" for what I refer to as individual
agency.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservations of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 153. But see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 932 (1973) ("I suppose there is nothing to prevent one from using the word 'privacy'
to mean the freedom to live one's life without governmental interference. But the Court obviously
does not so use the term.").
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
17. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and Kennedy, writes for the plurality:
"[The goal of constitutional adjudication is surely not to remove inexorably 'politically divisive'
issues from the ambit of the legislative process, whereby the people through their elected representa-
tives deal with matters of concern to them." Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct.
3040, 3058 (1989). Justice Scalia expresses the same concern more directly in a separate concur-
rence: "[O]ur retaining control, through Roe, of what I believe to be, and many of our citizens
recognize to be, a political issue, continuously distorts the public perception of the role of this
Court." Id. at 3065. Despite the overtures, Webster does not expressly overrule Roe. Id. at 3058.
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addresses the debate revived in Webster: Whether state legislatures or
the Supreme Court should set the bounds of political power on the abor-
tion question. Although state legislatures should endeavor to avoid ille-
gitimately infringing individual liberty, their actions are properly
reviewable by the Supreme Court under the fourteenth amendment. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has assumed responsibility since the passage of
the fourteenth amendment, by virtue of the characteristics and powers
granted it in the Constitution and in the tradition of judicial review, to
prevent state governments from unduly infringing individual liberty.
Although the Note suggests some improvements for the analysis in Roe
v. Wade, it concludes that the Supreme Court's decision in that
landmark case is consistent with the principles supporting our form of
government: respect for individual agency and unwillingness to coerce
more than a minimum level of morally good behavior.
The Note does not address the many other abortion-related dilem-
mas that state legislatures and the Supreme Court have faced and will yet
face: Whether public funds, employees, or facilities acquired in part
from persons deeply opposed to abortion can be used to fund abortions;
whether notice of intent to abort must be given to fathers of the fetus;
whether notice must be given to parents of pregnant minors; which regu-
lations of the abortion procedure exceed a state's powers; and whether
and to what extent the law should require pregnant women to refrain
from drugs and alcohol that harm fetal development. All these issues
require separate consideration of the purposes and powers of government
in their resolution and are beyond the scope of this Note.
I. THE SEPARATION OF MORAL AND POLITICAL POWER
A. Foundation for the Separation: The Capacity for Individual
Agency
If forcing moral conduct would assure right conduct 8 and still al-
low individuals to develop a sense of responsibility, society would lose
nothing by forcing moral conduct. In fact, society would gain. Rather
than a world where some do right and some do wrong, with varying
degrees of aspiration to do right or wrong, we would have a world where
almost all do right. Aristotle saw this potential and argued that compel-
ling the young to do good would allow some individuals to develop good
habits as they mature. Continuing that compulsion into adulthood
18. I am aware of the difficulty of establishing a consensus on what is "right conduct." For
purposes of this Part, I am speaking to the individual reader as if we all agreed with her or his
judgments of right and wrong to whatever extent she or he makes those judgments.
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would not burden them and would control the unruly at the same time.
Aristotle writes:
For most people are swayed rather by compulsion than argument, and
by punishments rather than by a sense of what is noble. This is why
some believe that lawgivers ought to exhort and try to influence people
toward a life of virtue because of its inherent nobility, in the hope that
those who have made good progress through their habits will listen to
them. Chastisement and penalties, they think, should be imposed
upon those who do not obey and are of an inferior nature, while the
incorrigible ought to be banished abroad. 19
While many may object to Aristotle's proposal, few would contend
that his description of human nature is wholly inaccurate. Punishments
often do sway individuals more than a sense of what is noble. However,
the important question remains whether some individuals fail to respond
to what is noble because of an "inferior nature" (bestowed by bad genes
or improper education)- that is, whether they are incapable of so re-
sponding-or because, for a variety of reasons, none of which absolves
them of final responsibility, they do not develop the moral capacities pos-
sessed by normal, adult human beings.20 If the former is true, requiring
those adults with an inferior nature to govern their lives without the
compulsion of external penalties is neither sensible nor kind. However, if
the latter is true of adults, then force generally will not encourage the
development of desirable attitudes and behavior. Force under such cir-
cumstances will do about as much good as moving another's limbs in an
attempt to strengthen their muscles for them. Therefore, knowing if all
normal adults have the capacity for responsible moral behavior, like
knowing if a person has muscles, helps determine whether one encour-
ages others to flex (uses moral power or persuasion) or does all the pull-
ing herself (uses political power or coercion). 21
19. ARiSTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 296-97 (M. Osdwald trans. 1962); see Martin Dia-
mond, Ethics and Pofitic=" The American Way, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 75, 80-81 (R. Horwitz 3d ed. 1986) ("Human character, Aristotle argues, can be per-
fected only within... the political community, and through what it alone can supply, namely, good
laws 'with teeth in them'....").
20. By "normal, adult human being," I mean a not mentally retarded or otherwise severely
mentally handicapped adult human being. Although adverse life circumstances will make the lack
of moral behavior in normal adults more understandable, under a liberal theory of human nature
nothing can deprive individuals of ultimate responsibility for a lack of wisdom, self control, and
love.
21. Professor Ruth Grant points out in her book, JOHN LOCKE'S LIBERALISM 205 (1987), that
"[a] just estimation of men's capacities must be the foundation for any theoretical effort that hopes to
offer men practical guidance in managing the political problem." She thoroughly discusses John
Locke's estimation of humankind's capacity to reason and its implications for the possibility of polit-
ical theory as well as for individual agency. Id. at 12-51.
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Whether individuals use individual agency in a manner compatible
with others in the community, and whether they develop themselves well
or poorly, are questions that differ from the question whether they have
the capacity to do so. If they have the capacity, political power can alle-
viate and prevent damage from severely antisocial behavior, but only
moral persuasion can alleviate or prevent damage from undeveloped abil-
ities and lack of goodness.22 Adverse life circumstances may make fail-
ures more understandable, but an adult individual ultimately cannot
blame anyone or anything for immoral behavior under a liberal theory of
human nature: Human beings are capable and therefore must be free
and responsible. The prize of individual liberty is that some individuals
will develop their moral capacities in difficult or relatively congenial cir-
cumstances, including their capacity for wisdom, care, and responsibility
for their own and others' welfare. These individuals will feel and act
responsibly to an extent that would not be possible without individual
liberty. The price of individual liberty is that some individuals, out of
bitterness, fear, ignorance, or love of other things, will not develop their
moral capacities and will behave in self-aggrandizing or hurtful ways.
The prize cannot be had without the price.23 We may have morally right
conduct without individual liberty, but not morally responsible human
beings.
No one can prove empirically that individuals who abuse their own
freedom of action by damaging themselves and others (in ways that polit-
ical power may or may not alleviate) are capable of doing better. To
assume that they do, contrary to Aristotle, is an experiment of faith in
humankind. However, observation, introspection, and experience does
give confidence in this assumption and supports the decision to respect
individual agency with both its prize and its price.
Recognizing and accepting the price of individual agency should not
invite feelings of superiority, separation, or contempt toward others. We
owe to each other commitment, comfort, and patience, however unde-
serving of them we sometimes may be, as well as an occasional thought-
22. See infra notes 46-65 and accompanying text (discussing the different purposes of moral
and political power). Mill writes, "It is not because men's desires are strong that they are ill; it is
because their consciences are weak." JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON
LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 69, 127 (H. Arton ed. 1972).
23. See Robert Goldwin, Of Men and Angels: A Search for Morality in the Constitution, in THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 35 ("The morality most
appropriate to the American way ... is a morality that is moderate, that does not crusade, that
accepts the fact that among human beings who are free there will be abuses .... ).
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ful rebuke. This moral duty arises from our equal worth, and our
potential for developing voluntary moral behavior.24
B. The Separation of Moral and Political Power in the Founding of
the United States
In contrast to Aristotle, the original thirteen colonies based the le-
gitimacy of their revolution partly on a belief, taken from John Locke's
political philosophy, that when political power inappropriately intrudes
on individual liberty the people have the right to abolish it.
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal;
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That,
to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed. That, whenever
any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
right of the people to alter or abolish it and to institute new govern-
ment .... 25
Obviously, "created equal" does not mean "created the same" in interest
or ability. When discussing the cause of factions in society while defend-
ing the government described by the Constitution, James Madison ex-
pressly noted the varying interests and abilities among persons: "The
diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property origi-
nate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The
protection of these faculties is the first object of government. '26 Rather,
"equal" means equal in the possession of faculties suited to individual
agency in ordering individual lives.
No matter how much individuals differ in interest and ability,27 they
do not differ so much that as a general matter some are able to exercise
individual agency whereas others are not. As Locke emphasizes in his
political theory, the most important implication of this assumption for
24. See J.S. MILL, supra note 22, at 144 ("Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish
the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter."). In
contrast with my position, Mill does allow for separation from and expressions of contempt toward
others. Id. at 146.
25. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Professor Mary Ann Glendon com-
pares the American emphasis on individual rights and equality with the European leanings toward
social responsibility and moral education in the civil law. Professor Glendon believes Americans
have neglected the educational power of the law-that we need to incorporate more of Aristotle's
vision into our lawmaking because "law is, among other things, the art of pursuing dignified living,
of establishing meaning and constituting community...." MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESrERN LAW 142 (1987).
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
27., Diamond, supra note 19, at 103 ("But the Asherican political order nonetheless still presup-
posed that an inequality of virtues and abilities was rooted in human nature and that this inequality
would manifest itself and flourish in the private realm of society.").
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political government is that no one, however superior in intelligence, can
claim a right to govern others without their consent. 28 Locke writes:
To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we
must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state
of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their posses-
sions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of
nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other
man.
A state also of equality, wherein all power and jurisdiction is re-
ciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more
evident, than that.creatures of the same species and rank, promiscu-
ously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the
same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without sub-
ordination or subjection .... 29
Justice Douglas, concurring in Roe v. Wade, articulates the same princi-
ple of individual liberty, or individual agency, using the language of
"privacy:"
That right [of privacy] includes the privilege of an individual to plan
his own affairs, for, "outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every
American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he
pleases, go where he pleases." 30
The government described in the United States Constitution rests
not only on the assumption of equality in the possession of capacities
suited to individual agency but also, as Madison suggests in the following
example, on the fact that many individuals do not develop their capacity
for morally good behavior:
28. Walter Berns, Religion and the Founding Principle, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 218 ("Being free and equal with respect to natural right,
and however unequal they may be according to any religious doctrine or in any other respect, no
man may justly rule another without his consent .... ); Diamond, supra note 19, at 103 ("American
democracy... denied the ancient claim of excellence to rule as a matter of right. Now this denial is
of immense importance because, in contrast with the ancient justification of the political claims of
the few, it deeply popularizes the very foundation of political life.").
John Locke's liberalism envisions consent to any form of government, such as a democracy,
oligarchy, or even an hereditary monarchy, that preserves the life, liberty, and property of individu-
als as all the natural equality of humankind requires. J. LOCKE, supra note 6, §§ 132-33; see also R.
GRANT, supra note 21, at 123-36 (discussing the practical problem of knowing when individuals
have consented to the form of government and knowing the extent of their obligation to obey once
consent is secure). He does, however, proceed to recommend the separation of powers in a "well-
ordered commonwealth," J. LOCKE, supra note 6, §§ 143-48, and to discuss principles of "fair and
equal representation," id. §§ 157-58. He also emphasizes the residual right of the people to alter
"the legislative" if the government violates their natural rights. Id. § 149.
29. 3. LOCKE, supra note 6, § 4 (emphasis in original).
30. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) (holding that Secretary of State's denial of passports to persons associated
with the Communist party without explicit authorization from Congress is due process violation));
see supra note 15.
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A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning govern-
ment, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice...
have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mu-
tual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.3'
The debates in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 about almost every
issue in the proposed Constitution reflected concern for the best way to
prevent tyranny (or protect individual agency and representative democ-
racy) and avoid anarchy (or avoid widespread abuse of individual agency
uncontrolled by organized political power).32 The government needed to
be organized to protect itself and its citizens from animosity, selfishness,
and abuse of power-inevitable consequences of individual liberty-
without imperiling responsible care for others and the wise exercise of
power-also impossible without individual liberty.
Because the government is founded on the principle that
"[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition" 33 rather than on prin-
ciples that depend on public virtue in our leaders, some people have ac-
cused the United States of moral purposelessness. Professor Benjamin
Barber writes, "The republic worked because it never tried to contrive a
center; and thus, by eliciting the assent of the citizenry to this value de-
fault, acquired a center after all-in the acquiescence of the people to
purposelessness. '' 34 The Anti-Federalists argued during the debates over
ratification of the Constitution that the large republic created by the
Constitution "dangerously ignored" the cultivation of virtue essential to
the maintenance of liberty, which was only possible in smaller, homoge-
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
32. Examples of the delegates' pervasive awareness of the tyranny/liberty tension include: the
first resolution in the Virginia Plan as proposed to the Convention-"Resolved that the Articles of
Confederation ought to be so corrected and enlarged as to accomplish... 'common defense, security
of liberty and general welfare,' " JAMES MADISON, NOTES oF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, at 30 (A. Koch ed. 1987); the debate whether unity in the executive would lead to or
protect against tyranny, id. at 46-47; Benjamin Franklin's warning of the need to guard against the
"two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men," the love of power and money,
id. at 52; Mr. Sherman's argument against the executive veto "enabling any one man to stop the will
of the whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom," id. at 62; and the
observation that "[n]otwithstanding the oppressions and injustice experienced among us from de-
mocracy; the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted,"
id. at 64. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 227 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Madison says that
"government itself [is] the greatest of all reflections on human nature" and if "men were angels, no
government would be necessary." Id.
34. Benjamin Barber, The Compromised Republic: Public Purposelessness in America, in THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 53; cf Joseph Cropsey, The
United States as Regime and the Sources of the American Way of Life, in id., at 172 (Thus far, there
is "[n]o mitigation of modern man's dissatisfaction with the absence of any exaltation, vivacity or
high-heartedness from official political modernity as laid down by Hobbes and Locke and, inciden-
tally, embodied in our parchment regime ... ").
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nous, agrarian communities. 35 And Alexis de Tocqueville warns against
the tendency toward materialistic individualism at the expense of gener-
osity in the United States:
Men living in democratic times have many passions, but most of their
passions either end in the love of riches or proceed from it.... When
all the members of a community are independent of or indifferent to
each other, the co-operation of each of them can be obtained only by
paying for it. .... 36
From a perspective that suffers the price of individual liberty by al-
lowing morally wrong conduct, the U.S. political project does have lower
sights than did Aristotle, who believed that "laws can make us good."' 37
Ideally, government in the United States does not use political power to
force a high level of moral virtue-only the minimum necessary for
peaceful coexistence. 38 However, from a perspective that emphasizes the
prize of individual liberty-responsible, wise, and caring individuals-
the U.S. political project aims higher than did Aristotle. Our society is
simply not satisfied vith right conduct on many matters. We want indi-
vidually chosen right conduct, or moral goodness.39 As Professor Martin
Diamond describes it, "the explanation of the puzzling American dis-
crepancy-character formation, but not by use of the laws- will be
found... in the American idea of what is advantageous and right for
humans." 4° He further suggests that the founders were confident that at
35. HERBERT STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 19-21 (1981); Robert
Horwitz, John Locke and the Preservation of Liberty: A Perennial Problem of Civic Education, in
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 138.
36. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA bk. 3, ch. XVII, at 228 (H. Reeve
trans., P. Bradley ed. 1946); see also Cropsey, supra note 34, at 174 ("We are dissatisfied with our-
selves because our regime and life are marked by private striving for the satisfaction of individual
goals rather than seeking to attain our individual ends through the mediation of a perfectly social act
of provision.").
37. ARISTOTLE, supra note 19, at 299.
38. Diamond, supra note 19, at 83 ("In place of the utopian end postulated by the ancients, the
forced elevation of human character, the modems substituted a lowered political end, namely,
human comfort and security."); Richard Hofstadter, The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism, in
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 65 ("One thing that
the Fathers did not propose to do, because they thought it impossible, was to change the nature of
man to conform with a more ideal system.").
For a discussion of harms the U.S. government does and does not alleviate or prevent with
political power, see infra notes 68-72, 107-11 and accompanying text. For examples of arguable
violations of the principle that government will not employ political power to force moral goodness,
see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing religion and politics, the prohibition amend-
ment, and the recent efforts to prohibit flag-burning) and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(holding that states may criminalize consensual homosexual sodomy).
39. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 58 (1963) ("[Wjhat is valuable here [in
the domain of morality] is voluntary restraint, not submission to coercion, which seems quite empty
of moral value.").
40. Diamond, supra note 19, at 105.
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least among some people, "the full range of the higher human virtues
would have suitable opportunity to flourish... from religion, education,
family upbringing, and simply out of the natural yearnings of human
nature."41
Further, the U.S. political project aims higher than any other mod-
em form of government in the possibility for good community, despite
the fact that the critics of liberal government often mistake individual
agency for selfish individualism. Professor Lisa Cahill writes:
In such [liberal] views, persons are seen essentially as free and autono-
mous agents who come into society to protect self-interest by a series
of mutually advantageous agreements. Society or community is thus
secondary to the existence of the individual; persons are not social by
nature and have no natural obligations antecedent to their free
consent.42
Professor Ruth Grant argues to the contrary:
The opposite of Locke's political individualism, however, is not com-
munity, but hierarchy. He is opposing the equality and freedom of
men to the idea that there is a natural or divinely ordained hierarchy
among them. Lockean individualism therefore is not incompatible
with the recognition of the importance of communal ties, family as-
sociations, and social norms, though it is a critique of authoritarian
political communities. 43
An autonomous individual need not give priority to individual values
above community values, although he or she certainly is free to do so.
The significance of autonomy is that all individuals, although influenced
by their social environment, have the imagination and ability to choose
what to value, including community, free of political coercion. People
are ultimately responsible for what they do and do not become, individu-
ally and collectively, as a result of their choice of values.
With politically guaranteed freedom of religion, speech, press, and
association, the United States is the best possible environment for the
41. Id. at 107.
42. Lisa Cahill, Abortion, Autonomy, and Community, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIP-
FERENCES, supra note 3, at 261, 266; see also Rosanne Kennedy, Feminist Legal Theory: Changing
the Subject, at 2 n.5 (1989) (unpublished manuscript available from the author) ("The autonomous
individual who gives priority to individual over community values is often called 'the liberal self.' ").
Professor Ruth Grant, in her article, Locke's Political Anthropology and Lockean Individualism,
supra note 7, at 43 n.2, lists other sources that reflect a similar interpretation of Lockean
individualism.
43. Grant, supra note 7, at 51. Professor Grant writes further:
My purpose is to show that at least one classical liberal [Locke] recognized fully the extent
to which human beings are social beings, but did not believe that that fact dictated any
particular political conclusions.... The challenge to the communitarians is to show either
that a communitarianism that attacks liberal individualism can nonetheless produce
nonauthoritarian communities, or that, if it can't, community is worth the price.
Id. at 43, 61 (footnote omitted).
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development of wise, responsible, and caring individuals and communi-
ties.44 If Americans fail in this opportunity, they fail not from insuffi-
cient use of political power, but rather from insufficient use of moral
power and from an inability to reach a voluntary consensus on moral
dilemmas, not from moral purposelessness in their government. 45
C. The Different Methods and Purposes of Moral and Political Power
1. Political Power Can Stifle Individual Responsibility and Develop-
ment. Separating moral and political power and distinguishing the pur-
poses of each, although the purposes sometimes overlap, rests on the
assumption that normal, adult human beings are capable of moral re-
sponsibility that cannot be coerced; indeed, coercion on some matters
stifles the development of responsibility. Beliefs regarding religious mat-
ters and commitments to morally good behavior such as generosity, hon-
esty, and kindness provide examples of attitudes and behavior that do not
develop as a result of the use of force. Although "right conduct" in some
instances can be forced, the inner commitment that makes moral action
meaningful must come from individual, voluntary affirmation.
Coercing adults who will not make morally good choices through
their individual agency into making better choices usually does not make
them morally good people. Rather, the coercion often drives them to
rebel against the coercion, or submit without assuming any responsibility
for the coerced action.46 In either case, their judgment has not improved,
and their inner commitment to the better choice has not been secured.
John Locke's description of the inability to secure worthwhile religious
commitment through coercion illustrates this point:
[T]rue and saving Religion consists in the inward persuasion of the
Mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God.... [A]nd
Penalties in this case are absolutely impertinent; because they are not
proper to convince the mind.... It is only Light and Evidence that can
work a change in Mens Opinions; which Light can in no manner pro-
ceed from corporal Sufferings, or any other outward Penalties....
44. I write this with confidence and hope as a member of a community aspiring to those ide-
als-the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the Mormons). Although we have our diffi-
culties, as does any community of free agents, I honor my fellow latter-day saints for the depth of
their commitment to the complete well-being of others as well as themselves. My respect for the
organization, composed of persons of widely-varying interests and abilities, has grown tremendously
as I have participated with them in California, Washington, Utah, and North Carolina.
45. See text accompanying note 34. Robert Goldwin writes, "And that conviction, that we are
truly a moral nation of moral men and moral women, is essential to our survival and happiness,
because of the way we are constituted." Goldwin, supra note 23, at 39.
46. Cf H.L.A. HART, supra note 39, at 21-22 ("The second aspect of legal enforcement bears
on those who may never offend against the law, but are coerced into obedience by the threat of legal
punishment.... [I]nterference with individual liberty... is itself the infliction of a special form of
suffering--often very acute--on those whose desires are frustrated by the fear of punishment.").
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[M]en cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no. And
therefore, when all is done, they must be left to their own
Consciences.47
Laws that extend too far into the domain of individual agency also
deprive adults who would use agency to make morally good choices of
the need to explore different possibilities and thereby develop good judg-
ment. The fit of the laws with their natural inclinations and the ease of
following without thinking deeply or discovering why can discourage
growth. John Stuart Mill thoroughly discusses this observation in his
essay, On Liberty:
He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He
must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activ-
ity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when
he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate deci-
sion .... It is possible that he might be guided in some good path, and
kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be
his comparative worth as a human being? It really is of importance,
not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are that do
it.4 8
Sometimes governments should refrain from using political power to
force decisions on individuals when the state lacks confidence in the
universality of the answers, but that is not the only occasion. Sometimes
the state should refrain because the decisions require voluntary affirma-
tion to be meaningful. When "right" entails individual commitments to
concern for others or deference to God, for example, people cannot be
forced to assume these commitments. 49 The individual, not family mem-
bers, communities, or governments, should answer questions that require
such commitments because the most important consequence in answering
them, among other consequences, is an individual's acceptance or rejec-
tion of deeply binding obligations.50
2. Moral Right Without Political Enforcement. Refraining from
the use of political power to force moral behavior does not always entail
abandoning the truth of the moral principles. On some matters left to
individual agency, such as career interests or musical tastes, appreciation
for diversity is a good in itself.51 On other matters, pluralism may not be
47. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 27, 38 (J. Tully ed. 1983).
48. J.S. MILL, supra note 22, at 127; see also R. GRANT, supra note 21, at 194 ("And to be
truly free, he must be guided by his own reason. It is not enough to do the reasonable thing. A man
must have reached the conclusion on his own that it is the reasonable thing to do.").
49. J.S. MILL, supra note 22, at 85, 134-35.
50. See id. at 151.
51. Mill distinguishes between moral and political power in the project of making human be-
ings good, but also carves out a large domain of individual agency that should not be disturbed by
coercion or moral condemnation. J.S. MILL, supra note 22, at 123-42.
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the highest good. Professor Robert Goldwin writes: "[T]he first step [in
practical or political morality] is to make the moral judgment, to recog-
nize evil as evil, and not look the other way, or refuse to judge (on rela-
tivistic grounds), or shrug our shoulders and say we 'don't care.' "52
The variety of opinions notwithstanding, a person can believe in
right and wrong answers to moral questions, including the question
whether or not to abort a fetus. Individuals may struggle to discover the
right answers since no moral code can account for all the variations in
real circumstances, and they may struggle even more to adhere to the
answers they have discovered.5 3 However, this observation need not dis-
solve one's thinking into "ethical relativism," if that term means that
whatever individuals may choose for themselves is right because of the
struggle involved in choosing.5 4
Feminist scholar and theorist Rosalind Petchesky mistakes the
moral position that abortion is wrong for a denial of individual responsi-
bility on the abortion issue:
52. Goldwin, supra note 23, at 36. The second step is to decide whether to use moral or polit-
ical power to address the evil. See id. Professor Gordon Wood expresses the hope of some of the
Founders that the diversity of opinions colliding freely in society would lead to "the ultimate tri-
umph of Truth." Wood, The Democratization of Mind in the American Revolution, in THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 133.
Rosalind Petchesky warns against the dangers of absolutism and states that it is "false to link
relativism irrevocably with amorality." R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 329. She suggests that all
"moral, legal, and philosophical questions" are subject to "historical and cultural variations." Id.
While there is room to learn restraint and appreciation for context from her without abandoning
moral truth on some matters, she ultimately disagrees that abortion is one of those matters. Id. at
366-67, 374.
53. R. GRANT, supra note 21, at 180 ("We cannot know all things with certainty, and the
principles that we can know do not automatically govern our behavior."); see Petchesky, supra note
5, at 365 (citing recent attitude surveys showing the disjunction between abortion beliefs and
practices).
54. See Segers, supra note 5, at 251-52 ("A commitment to the availability of legalized abortion
need not bind one to a kind of casual ethical relativism.... I believe that feminists can and should
define the moral standards and principles against which to measure our behavior with respect to
abortion.").
Rosalind Petchesky describes the "morality of praxis" in her book, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S
CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, supra note 5, at 364-74. A
popular way of expressing the extreme form of the "morality of praxis," or contextual morality, on
the abortion issue is that every individual must exercise moral judgment about abortion, but no one
can tell another individual that their decision is right or wrong. Id. at 333 (quoting a Baptist clergy-
man) ("Abortion presents a matter for individual moral decision .... ); see also Luker, supra note 4,
at 44 ("[P]ro-choice people tend to see ethical issues as matters of individual conscience, guided by
moral principles, rather than as moral codes per se. Hence, the emphasis that pro-choice people put
on abortion as an individual, private choice."); McLoughlin, supra note 2, at 29 ("It's a permanent
decision .... I don't think that anyone has the right to say, 'You have to do it this way.' ").
Although she would never support references to general, categorical right and wrong, Rosalind
Petchesky does recognize some limitation to private morality regarding abortion. For example, she
writes that aborting "solely on the basis of gender preference" is "immoral." R. PETCHESKY, supra
note 5, at 349.
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Abortion is wrong, in their view, not only because it "destroys inno-
cent life," but even more because it rests on and validates a principle of
morality that assumes that individuals must make choices for them-
selves and ought to do so in terms of the concrete situations in which
they live.55
Not all pro-life individuals conclude that contextual morality is wrong
as a matter of principle, although they conclude that aborting a fetus
rarely is moral in any context. In the dilemmas people face every day,
"right" and "wrong" are a function of a person's intentions, her judg-
ments about how best to realize those intentions, and the effects of her
resulting action on herself and others. Meaningful morality cannot be
anything but contextual. Realizing this, family therapist Theodora
Ooms aptly describes the difficulty of applying moral values to specific
situations:
Moral values-such as the need to preserve and protect life- are ide-
als to strive for. In concrete moral situations, they nearly always have
to be weighed against other, conflicting moral values. They serve as
principles to be applied differently to different situations, and the con-
sequences of applying them also need to be taken into account.5 6
Although I agree with Ooms' assessment of the general difficulty, I
do not share her view that the responsibility for beginning life and the
moral claims of the fetus to continued life do not outweigh almost all
other considerations. Some intentions and the means to accomplish
them are universally better, in a moral sense, than others. I submit that
accepting the possibility of pregnancy from heterosexual intimacy and
determining to nurture the fetus should pregnancy occur is a better deci-
sion than engaging in sexual intimacy and then deciding to abort a fetus
that may be conceived. Abortion is an immoral rejection of the mutual
responsibilities of two individuals to a developing fetus, responsibilities
that were voluntarily acquired.5 7 I do not slight the gravity and difficulty
of the struggle faced by women and men who deal with unwanted
pregnancies, or the need to allow individuals to make their difficult
choices free from political coercion, as discussed below. However, I con-
tend that principles not appropriately enforced by political power may
still be the right principles on which individuals should make their
55. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 379.
56. Theodora Ooms, Commentary to Chapter 6, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFER-
ENCES, supra note 3, at 171, 172.
57. Unfortunately, the purpose of this Note will not allow a full defense of my moral position,
but see infra text accompanying notes 97-99 for a slightly longer statement. Although she advocates
coercive prevention of abortion, Mary Meehan provides a concise moral statement for valuing the
fetus even in grave social, emotional, and financial circumstances, and even if the fetus is handi-
capped. Meehan, supra note 3, at 151-68.
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choices regarding abortion. The individual and collective struggle to
know and adhere to these principles is the domain of moral power.
Refraining from political coercion on moral questions should not
also mean abandoning the public struggle over issues such as abortion.
Moral power cannot operate properly, and individuals cannot develop
fully, without using every channel available to persuade individuals to
make right choices on moral issues, and this includes public speaking and
writing. Mill offers insight concerning the importance of using persua-
sion as an aspect of moral power:
In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confi-
dence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to
criticism of his opinions and conduct.... No wise man ever acquired
his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human
intellect to become wise in any other manner.... Instead of any dimi-
nution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to
promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find
other instruments to persuade people to their good than whips and
scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort.58
3. No Bright Lines Here. Securing peaceful, purposeful human
community depends on choosing well when political power is necessary
to ensure that individuals live peaceably in political community and
when the use of political power is inappropriate. Often persons' strong
religious and moral commitments have spilled over into political activity
in America.5 9 Members of the First Congress believed religion was es-
sential to the preservation of morality, which was, in turn, essential to
the preservation of liberty. Consequently, they expected the states to
continue to foster religion over non-religion by public assistance and ex-
58. J.S. MILL, supra note 22, at 88, 144.
59. In his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice John Harlan reasons from an unexamined assump-
tion that the State has some "rightful concern for its people's moral welfare":
The right of privacy most manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would not suggest that
adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, how-
ever privately practiced. So much has been explicitly recognized in acknowledging the
State's rightful concern for its people's moral welfare. But not to discriminate between
what is involved in this case and either the traditional offenses against good morals or
crimes which, though they may be committed anywhere, happen to have been committed
or concealed in the home, would entirely misconceive the argument that is being made.
367 U.S. 497, 552-53 (1961) (citation omitted). For a discussion of the duty judges have to make the
reasoning behind their assumptions explicit, see Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARV. L. REv. 829, 862-63 (1990).
Ironically, Justice Harlan's emphasis in Poe on protecting private marital relations from gov-
ernment intrusion is ignored by the Supreme Court in later cases. These cases trumpet Justice
Harlan's dissent in support of a general right to sexual and reproductive privacy for all individuals
regardless of marital status. Eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,




ample, while somehow remaining neutral among religions. 60 Current
disagreements over matters such as school prayer, nativity scenes on
public property, and tax exemptions for churches are evidence of the
difficulty involved in judging when and how to use political power with
respect to religion. Another example, the doomed prohibition amend-
ment, partly stemmed from some individuals' aspiration to use political
power to instill higher ideals in other individuals. 61 For some, the recent
attempts to prohibit flag-burning represent a similar aspiration.
Part of the difficulty in judging when to use political rather than
moral power stems from the realization that on some level, all laws regu-
late moral behavior. Laws regulate relationships between people that in-
volve an obligation to do or refrain from doing certain things. Stealing
money from a business partner, failing to pay taxes, driving over the
speed limit, sexually abusing a child, or killing another person all involve
immoral conduct that the political community refuses to tolerate without
regard for the moral commitments, or lack of commitments, of the indi-
viduals involved.
Further, almost all behavior implicates moral concerns of some
kind. Human beings are inescapably interdependent. Everything we do
or fail to do affects the people with whom we live and work.62 The same
action may both benefit some and harm others, depending on the values
and perspectives of those individuals affected by it. The political commu-
nity must choose which harms it will prevent and alleviate with coercive
political power and which should be left to the conscience and agency of
individuals and their communities.
60. Berns, supra note 28, at 207-14.
Abraham Lincoln also teaches that American democracy needs civil religion, see Michael Zuck-
ert, Locke and the Problem of Civil Religion, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, supra note 19, at 181, and Tocqueville writes that "provided the citizens profess a reli-
gion, the peculiar tenets of that religion are of little importance to [society's] interests." 1 A. DE
TOCQUEViLLE, supra note 36, ch. XVII, at 303.
John Locke also was convinced that religious activity of some kind is necessary for peaceful
coexistence in political community. He would have supported political intolerance of atheists in
tandem with religious liberty to all believers. Locke, supra note 47, at 51. The United States polit-
ical community disagrees with Locke on that point, U.S. CONST. amend. I; e.g., Wallace v. Jafree,
472 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1985) (reaffirming that individual freedom of conscience protected by the first
amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all), but not because we all do
or do not believe religion essential for knowledge of truth or the attainment of human excellence.
We may believe religion is essential to these ends and yet agree that religion should not be coerced
for two reasons: The coercion is not necessary for peaceful political coexistence, as Locke mistak-
enly thought (atheists can live up to their obligations as well as any religious individual), and because
the attainment of human excellence demands freely-considered commitment. Therefore, forcing
right conduct that prevents freely considered commitment will not do.
61. U.S. CoNsr. amends. XVIII, XXI.
62. J.S. MILL, supra note 22, at 148.
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Clear rules that eliminate the need for continual reexamination and
good judgment on this choice do not exist. 63 However, the two step anal-
ysis applied in Roe v. Wade 64 to decide whether abortion causes a harm
that should be prevented with political power threatens a confusing po-
larization of individual interests, or "fundamental rights," against "com-
pelling state interests." A liberal constitutional government such as we
have in the United States has a compelling interest in the preservation of
individuals in the appropriate exercise of individual agency.65 The im-
portance of agency in human development, as well as the gravity and
nature of the potential harm threatened by the lack of political coercion,
should guide the political community in making the choice whether to
prevent or alleviate a given harm through the use of political power.
II. THE ABORTION DEBATE
The importance of individual agency and assumptions about human
potential and human responses to coercive power have guided the Ameri-
can government in its use of political power.6 6 These same considera-
tions should guide the debates about abortion. The abortion dilemma
perhaps demands greater sensitivity to the difference between moral and
political power than any other current issue because of the significance of
63. Professor Ruth Grant counsels government actors making such choices in her discussion of
Locke's epistemology and political theory:
[W]hile certain knowledge of true standards of behavior is possible, it is difficult and re-
quires that we use our rational faculties well. And even then, such knowledge of abstract
principle is not sufficient by itself. . . . Even when the principle or the rule is clear, a
judgment must often be made as to whether it applies to the circumstances in question,
whether a given thing or action belongs to the categories included in the rule.
R. GRANT, supra note 21, at 49.
64. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("fundamental rights" can be limited only by a "compelling state
interest").
65. "Liberal" in this context does not mean the opposite of "conservative" as used in current
political discourse. It refers to a government founded for the purpose of preserving individual lib-
erty, such as Locke describes in his writings. Professor Ruth Grant explains: "Locke's is a dual
standard. One element cannot be elevated above the other, and there is no need to choose between
them. Both preservation and freedom are necessary conditions for legitimacy [in liberal govern-
ment], while neither alone is sufficient." R. GRANT, supra note 21, at 97-98. For a full discussion of
the relationship between freedom (individual agency) and the preservation of individuals in liberal
government, see id. at 88-98.
66. For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court strikes down Wisconsin's attempt
to encourage the payment of child support by preventing remarriage until the parent provides evi-
dence that the obligation is being met. The Court says a direct prohibition on marriage unreasona-
bly infringes individual liberty. 434 U.S. 374, 389 (1978). In Shapiro v. Thompson, the Court
reaffirms that "the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty
unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."
394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (waiting-period requirement before new-comers receive state public assist-
ance violates equal protection). For a discussion of the rejection of Good Samaritan laws in the
American legal system, see infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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the values in tension: protection of life and protection of individual
agency in deeply personal matters.67 Whether to include the fetus in the
political community and protect it with the same protection provided
each human being who is born requires consideration of the nature of the
harm caused by abortion, whether prohibiting abortion merely prevents
harm or also coerces sacrifices in behalf of the fetus, and whether we
desire morally responsible human beings or instead would settle for right
conduct without regard for individual commitments on this matter.
A. The Nature of the Harm in Abortion
John Stuart Mill writes that respect for individual agency ends when
"there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an
individual or to the public. ' 68 But if "damage" includes spiritual dam-
age, and assuming the failure to worship spiritually damages individuals,
then we would not have the first amendment. If it includes emotional
damage to public figures, then our libel laws would look different. And if
it includes symbolic damage to governmnet authority, perhaps we should
curtail expressive freedom with a flag-burning amendment.
Respect for individual agency requires tolerance for some kinds of
suffering brought about by wrong choices. "Definite damage" must have
a more restricted meaning than general human suffering to work as an
appropriate limitation on individual agency. Constitutional scholar Wal-
ter Berns paraphrases Thomas Jefferson's suggestion for the kind of dam-
age the government should alleviate or prevent with coercive power:
"Americans are not entitled to regard it as an injury--or an injury for
which the law will provide a remedy-for their neighbors to say there are
twenty gods or no God. Such religious opinions neither pick their pock-
ets nor break their legs ....- 69
Causing physical damage to persons and property has been a pun-
ishable crime in this country for centuries. 70 Some less tangible harms,
67. Researcher Gilbert Steiner writes: "Abortion can be counted on to be the dominant family-
related public problem for the indefinite future, and the one the policy process is least likely to
resolve, because neither side is comfortable with less than total victory, each side views its cause as
sacred, and both are right." GILBERT STEINER, THE FUTILITY OF FAMILY POLICY 71 (1981)
quoted in, M. GLENDON, supra note 25, at 40.
68. J.S. MILL, supra note 22, at 150; see also LOCKE, supra note 6, at 9 ("Every one, as he is
bound to preserve himself... may not, unless it be to do justice to an offender, take away, or impair
the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.").
69. Berns, supra note 28, at 217 (paraphrasing 4 THOMAs JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 78 (P. Leicester Ford ed. 1904)).
70. Murder, assault, battery, rape, larceny, embezzlement, burglary, and robbery are some fa-
miliar examples.
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such as harm resulting from racial segregation,71 also have become pun-
ishable, and courts increasingly award civil damages for "intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress." 72 One need not delve further into the
always evolving legal definitions of punishable and compensable harm to
recognize the difficult judgments required to decide whether political
power should alleviate or prevent harm of one kind but not another.
Much of the abortion debate revolves around the nature of the harm
done when a woman aborts a fetus. 73 Obviously, the damage to the fetus
is complete and irrevocable: Abortion destroys something that would
have developed into a born human being. However, this observation
does not answer the question whether the political community should
value the fetus to the same extent as a born human being and thus pre-
vent its destruction with coercive power. The observation leaves open
the question whether abortion causes a kind of harm that the political
community should not tolerate.74 This issue differs from whether indi-
viduals should value the fetus the same as a born human being because of
the additional concern for individual agency that forms the foundation of
our political community.
As discussed above, our common commitment in the political com-
munity necessarily falls far below our human potential for moral good-
ness. Indeed, because our political commitments are enforced by
71. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [Blacks] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.").
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). ("One who by extreme and outra-
geous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress ....") The evolution of this tort from special application in
cases of assault or for conduct on a common carrier, as reflected in the 1934 version of the RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 46, is described in GEORGE CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 905-24 (1983).
73. By "harm," I refer to the nature of the wrong, if any, in abortion, not the emotional or
physical harm to women that pro-life advocates document, see Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of
Feminists for Life et al., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-05),
and pro-choice advocates dispute, see R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 367.
74. I ultimately conclude that abortion is not one of the causes of suffering the political commu-
nity should eradicate. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. By "suffering," I mean the
moral and emotional suffering of those persons who struggle with the realization that others actually
would kill the unborn, and any suffering experienced by the fetus. By contrast, Professor Lisa Cahill
uses the inescapability of suffering-the suffering borne by a pregnant woman-to conclude that
abortion usually should not be allowed:
The liberal ethos discourages making personal sacrifices and encourages at best a minimal
appreciation of the virtue and even the necessity of constructive suffering. ... [S]ome
human situations have unavoidably tragic elements and that to be human is to bear these
burdens. We cannot be freed from all infringements on our self-fulfillment, and to persist-
ently demand that is to avoid moral agency in the complete sense.
Cahill, supra note 42, at 271-72.
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coercive power, we must limit them in order to realize a greater degree of
individual and collective moral goodness. Therefore, regardless of how
we ultimately answer questions such as those posed by abortion, we must
consider them carefully with the political/moral power distinction in
mind.
Pro-choice advocates sometimes have emphasized that a fetus is not
"human life" but rather the "potential" for human life. As such, they
argue, it can be treated as no more than a tumor or a tissue growth and
removed if desired.75 According to this perspective, the "harm" (if any)
in abortion is no concern for the political community. Some pro-life
advocates, on the other hand, have gone to the opposite extreme and
personified the fetus, acting as if it lacks only a voice, which they will-
ingly provide, and calling abortion murder.76
Both extremes distort reality. On the one hand, a developing fetus
with a unique genotype that will become a human being if undisturbed
differs significantly from a tumor. Free-lance writer Mary Meehan
posits:
And there is a special unfairness in penalizing the unborn for not hav-
ing size or abilities, which if left alone, they will surely develop. It is
almost like saying, "In another few months, you will grow to the point
where we cannot kill you because you will be too much like us. There-
fore, we will end your lives now .... ,,77
On the other hand, until the point of viability, a developing fetus lacks
not only a voice, but other mental and physical capacities that make an
individual. Feminist theorist Rosalind Petchesky articulates this view:
The most striking fallacy in the genetic arguments of anti-abortionists
is their leap from the fact of genetic individuality ... to the value of
human personhood. This is a problem, in part, of confusing the self,
the person, with her or his genetic basis, ignoring the enormously com-
75. See Jean Elshtain, Reflections on Abortion, Values, and the Family, in ABORTION: UNDER-
STANDING DIFFERENCES, supra note 3, at 47, 50 ("Examples of discourse that aim to distance us...
include arguments that construe the fetus, variously, as a 'parasite,' a 'tenant,' an air-borne 'spore,'
or 'property.' "); Mahowald, supra note 5, at 179 ("[A] genuinely pro-abortion position emphasizes
... the fetus is in reality an invasive growth, like a wart or a tumor.").
76. See JOHN NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES
171 (1979) ("When the mask is lifted from the liberty of abortion, it is seen that the liberty consists
in a freedom to knife, poison, starve, or choke a human being differing only in his or her degree of
helplessness .. ") quoted in R PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 331; Meehan, supra note 3, at 147 ("It
is a violent act, one that usually involves dismemberment of the human embryo or fetus.... But the
violence of abortion, though important, is secondary to the fact that it ends a human life."). Contra
R. PETCHSKY, supra note 5, at 328 ("idea that abortion is 'murder' and you are 'killing a baby' is a
culturally generated one, not shared by many eras and peoples").
77. Meehan, supra note 3, at 150.
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plex interaction between genes, environment, and development that ul-
timately determines who or what an actual person becomes. 78
On the most basic level, a developing fetus differs significantly from a
born human being in the complete symbiotic relationship with another
body necessary for its survival.
Greater scientific evidence will not improve the lack of consensus on
the fetus' relative value or on the gravity of the harm involved in abor-
tion. We already know a lot. Even junior high school students are
taught that from the moment one sperm penetrates the ovum, a series of
rapid divisions begins a progression of development-heartbeat at eight-
een days, brainwaves at forty-two days, all organs formed by the ninth or
tenth week.79 Unless disturbed by natural or artificial forces, this union
of sperm and ovum will become a human being capable of existing
outside the uterus. Some persons on both sides of the abortion debate are
willing to agree that conception and implantation in the uterus is the
most definite point to identify the beginning of human life. Nevertheless,
both sides continue to disagree about the role of the government in
forcefully preventing abortion.80 As psychologist Sidney Callahan asks
poignantly, "How can it be that so many wise and good people can know
all the same facts, be familiar with all the same arguments, and yet reach
different conclusions"?81 Something more than biological reality affects
one's evaluation of the harm involved in abortion. A value judgment, not
a scientific determination, enables individuals to decide whether aborting
a fetus is acceptable or not. Differences in individual commitment to
religious or moral principles goes a long way in explaining the difference
in value judgments. The following descriptions illustrate how different
attitudes toward sex and pregnancy correspond to different evaluations
of the fetus.
78. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 337. Rosalind Petchesky thoroughly discusses the impor-
tance of the consciousness of relationship in making us human. Id. at 344-46.
79. PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTER, GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., MAKING AN INFORMED DECI-
SION ABOUT YOUR PREGNANCY (1988) (pamphlet).
80. Compare R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 337-38 ("It might be conceded that the fetus is a
form of life insofar as it is alive (as established by EEG readings, heartbeat, and other biological
responses) and it is human.... [But this] does not move us one step toward knowing what value to
give the fetus .... ") with Meehan, supra note 3, at 149, 151 ("Medical and scientific textbooks
affirm that the life of each human begins at fertilization (conception).... If their right to life is not
recognized and protected, then they are completely vulnerable to power and violence and death.").
81. Sidney Callahan, Value Choices in Abortion, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFER-
ENCES, supra note 3, at 285, 287. Sidney Callahan, who is pro-life, asks that question from a unique
vantage point. For over 30 years, she has been married to Daniel Callahan, who also speaks and
writes regularly about abortion from the pro-choice perspective. Together they organized and edited
the book, ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES. A dialogue between them is printed in
Friendly Persuasion, U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 3, 1988, at 30-31.
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If conception involves more than matter and natural forces, and a
soul pre-exists conception and enters the developing body at some point
before birth, 2 or if God spontaneously gives spirit to the developing
body at some point before birth,8 3 then we would need to know when
that occurred to avoid the substantial harm caused by prematurely dis-
embodying the soul. However, beliefs about ensoulment are inextricably
bound up with religious beliefs,84 which should not be enforced by polit-
ical power.85 Even if true, religious beliefs about human beginnings must
be considered and accepted or rejected as premises for action by free indi-
viduals if they are to have any meaning or power in individual lives.
Juxtaposed with those who conclude that abortion is a sin almost as
grave as murder, are those who say that abortion is more than the better
of difficult alternatives-it is not a harm at all, but a positive good in
many circumstances. Feminist theorist Rosalind Petchesky argues for
this position:
The view of abortion as a necessary evil born out of desperate circum-
stances is a liberal accommodation to recent waves of anti-abortion
(and anti-feminist) ideology .... The "necessary evil" concept oddly
forgets the spirit of buoyancy infusing not only feminists but masses of
women after Roe v. Wade. ... From this perspective, abortion con-
ducted under safe, affordable, and stigma-free conditions is neither a
necessary evil nor a matter of private choice. Rather, it is a positive
benefit that society has an obligation to provide to all who seek it, just
as it provides education and health benefits.86
82. Mormons, for instance, believe that each individual has existed forever as a conscious being;
that similar to energy/matter, intelligence (or consciousness) cannot be created or destroyed, see
DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 93: 29
(1981 ed.), but only improved by acquiring spirit bodies (fine matter) as literal children of a Heav-
enly Father and Mother before mortal life, and then bodies of flesh and bone as children of parents
on Earth. They believe that although individuals temporarily "die" (their spirits return to their pre.
birth form) all individuals will eventually "resurrect" into tangible bodies of flesh and bone that can
never die thereafter, such as those possessed by our Heavenly Father and Mother. Id. at 130: 22; see
also Ezekiel 37: 11-14 (analogy between the regathering of Israel and the resurrection); 1 Corinthians
15: 51-54 (discussing resurrection).
83. The Catholic Church, for instance, teaches that God creates life: "Human Life is precious
because it is the gift of a God whose love is infinite, and when God gives life, it is forever." Pope
John Paul II, Homily at Mass in Washington, D.C, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1979, at B6, quoted in
Meehan, supra note 3, at 148. For a discussion of historical changes in Catholic beliefs and teach-
ings about ensoulment and abortion, see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040,
3082-84 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
84. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 329, 332; Cahill, supra note 41, at 270.
85. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Virginia Abernethy, Children, Personhood, and a Pluralistic Society,
in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES, supra note 3, at 117, 133 ("The debate, one finds, is
not just about when biological human life acquires the rights associated with personhood. The de-
bate is about whether this nation shall depart from its constitutionally designed heritage of separa-
tion of Church and State."). But cf Cahill, supra note 42, at 263 ("I dissent from the proposition
that abortion is a narrowly religious issue.").
86. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 386-87.
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Still other people oppose abortion not for religious reasons, but
rather because they place great importance on the life-giving potential of
heterosexual sex.87 In some circumstances, these people may refrain
from sex to avoid altogether the possibility of pregnancy. Or if they en-
gage in sexual intimacy, with or without using birth control, they do so
fully prepared to assume responsibility for a pregnancy that might re-
sult.8 8 People with these perspectives value a fetus as a living, developing
human being and consider it an unjustified harm, with few exceptions, to
cut off fetal development.8 9
People who assume this level of responsibility for the life-giving po-
tential in sex do not necessarily appreciate the potential for pleasure in
sex less than others, as is sometimes suggested.90 Rather they seek inner
peace and fulfillment by subordinating their uninhibited pleasures to the
duties those pleasures potentially create. Psychologist Sidney Callahan
supports this view:
[I]n the synthesis proposed, sexual expression as an erotic manifesta-
tion of love and unity is equal in value to sexuality as procreative.
Neither dimension can be denied or discarded or can displace the other
in importance.... Excitement, love, and emotional fulfillment may be
necessary for the good life, constant sexual expression is not. When
human beings can have access to many other emotional joys and
pleasures equal to sex, then it is possible to preserve the procreative
dimension inherent in human sexuality by reserving sexual expression
for procreative contexts of commitment and love.91
Others emphasize, sometimes under the anguishing weight of in-
compatible concerns in the event of an unwanted pregnancy, that con-
ception is more appropriately attributable to natural forces or chance
than to a deliberate decision to engage in sexual relations.92 To them,
87. Callahan, supra note 81, at 287-93; ef Meehan, supra note 3, at 149 ("Yet, the absence of
religious belief does not remove all support from the notion of human rights.... Other people still
exist, and their very existence imposes obligations on us, just as our existence imposes obligations on
them.").
88. Callahan, supra note 81, at 288; Luker, supra note 4, at 33.
89. Callahan, supra note 81, at 291, 295 ("Stopping a pregnancy is in the same category of act
as stopping any dynamic, ongoing human life."). Contra R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 341 ("The
doctrine of fetal personhood .... demeans pregnant women, who are treated in this perspective as
the physical vessels for genetic messages rather than responsible moral agents. Motherhood in this
sense becomes, not a socially determined relationship, but a physiological function .... ").
90. Summarizing from her five-year study of pro-life and pro-choice activists, Kristin Luker
says that for pro-life people "a commitment to amative sex [sexual activity whose goal is sensual
pleasure and mutual enjoyment] is at odds with a primary commitment to mothering." Luker, supra
note 4, at 33.
91. Callahan, supra note 81, at 289-90. Sidney Callahan accepts contraception and voluntary
sterilization as "acceptable means to further the nurturing potential of a committed procreative
pair." Id. at 289.
92. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 336.
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conception is a happy or unhappy by-product of sex, but a by-product
nonetheless. Although this view admits that a fetus deserves weighty
consideration,93 no one need feel unduly bound by the joining of sperm
and egg which might occur even despite reliance on birth control. A
sincere desire to avoid or postpone parenting, commitments to personal
goals or to already-existing relationships (including other children), fi-
nancial or emotional insecurity, and other factors could justify terminat-
ing an unexpected pregnancy under this view of the role of human
agency in conception.94 To some people, abortion enables them to abide
by their original intention that the birth of a child not result from ongo-
ing heterosexual intimacy. As Rosalind Petchesky points out, they feel
that the risk of pregnancy should never prohibit women and men from
engaging in the sex:
A clear feminist vision, an alternative culture of sexuality embracing
passion and play as well as love,... a revolution in women's social
place and in the relations of reproduction is impossible without a
"new morality" of sex and love.... Abortion ... has to do with
women's sexual and moral autonomy as much as their physical integ-
rity .... [W]e may posit that sexual self-expression is itself a basic
human need so allied to a person's physical and emotional well-being
as to constitute an aspect of "health" in the widest sense.95
All of these attitudes emphasize only part of the life-giving pro-
cess-either the role of human agency or the role of natural forces-as a
premise for action. The degree of emphasis on human responsibility af-
fects one's view of whether the fetus deserves primary, equal, or rela-
tively minor weight when balanced with other concerns in the event of an
unwanted pregnancy. It is difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether a
person's attitude toward sex determines her view of the value of fetal life
or vice versa. But a person's views on both subjects mutually reinforce
the other view and together show a pattern of individual commitment.
Individuals usually will feel "right" and "justified" in the commitments
they accept, and they often find opposing views incomprehensible, if not
foolish or irresponsible.96
In my mind, individuals should value human agency in conception
enough that abortion is altogether unacceptable, except when pregnancy
93. Id. at 338, 348.
94. Id. at 365, 369; Callahan, supra note 81, at 292.
95. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 391, 392, 393; see Callahan, supra note 81, at 288; Luker,
supra note 4, at 40.
96. See R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 372 ("For the liberal it is not the woman who gets an
abortion who is 'selfish' but the one who doesn't-when she is too young or too poor or too 'incom-
petent.' "); Cahill, supra note 42, at 272 ("The decision to continue a pregnancy might be construed
as a decision by the stronger to assume burdens that would otherwise fall on the most defenseless.");
Luker, supra note 4, at 33; Ooms, supra note 56, at 174-75.
[Vol. 1990:81
ABORTION. PRIZE & PRICE
endangers a woman's life or is the product of rape or incest. (Since the
physical and psychological violation of human agency inherent in rape
and incest is incompatible with attributing moral responsibility to a wo-
man for the conception of a developing fetus, I cannot condemn her if
she chooses to abort.9 7) For a woman to carry a fetus to term and for a
man to share the burdens of pregnancy and childbearing is the better,
more responsible, more fulfilling commitment for human beings to
make.98 However, if keeping the baby is not possible, the woman should
plan to give the baby up for adoption rather than abort the fetus.99 And
we should employ all methods of moral power-writing, speaking, re-
buking, listening, encouraging-to persuade others to act responsibly
with regard for the beginnings of human life.
Individuals who value a fetus the same as a born human being often
feel strongly that the political community should enforce their value.
They point out the danger of valuing life differently because of its degree
of dependency or level of development, and they discuss the distinction
between liberty and license in society.10° Some think that protecting the
fetus with political power will reinforce the persuasive methods of moral
power.101 This view, however, fails to recognize that political enforce-
ment interferes with the operation of moral power in the abortion deci-
sion because of the importance of individual agency in moral conduct.
The pointed threat of coercion backing the expression of pro-life views in
the United States today derails the moral debate, masks the insights of
the anti-abortion perspective, and hampers its persuasive potential.
Some individuals who oppose abortion feel so strongly about pro-
tecting the fetus that they do not care about the possible lack of commit-
ment of the fetus' father and mother to the creation of their child. These
individuals would force a woman to give birth without regard to the ad-
verse effect of coercion on individual moral responsibility because of their
97. Contra Meehan, supra note 3, at 163-64 ("These problems are not the children's fault; we
should not blame the children or punish them for the failure or crimes of others.").
98. I would suggest further that confining sexual desires to the expression of attraction, care,
and emotional commitment in a marriage relationship is a happier, healthier choice for human be-
ings, all concern for pregnancy aside. Others disagree. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
99. Although giving a baby up for adoption can be traumatic, it also offers many benefits for the
child and the new family. As one commentator notes: "A nonfamilial, nonpossessive appeal to
continue a pregnancy can be made in order to give a new innocent life its chance to join the human
family and to be reared by those ready and able to enjoy the privilege." Callahan, supra note 81, at
288, 293. Unfortunately for all concerned, some minority women may not have the option to give
their babies to eager, caring adoptive parents. I am hopeful such a situation is not prevalent and will
not last.
100. M. GLENDON, supra note 25, at 37; B. NATHANSON, supra note 3, at 259-60; Callahan,
supra note 81, at 296; Meehan, supra note 3, at 151-52.
101. M. GLENDON, supra note 25, at 62; Callahan, supra note 81, at 301.
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confidence in the immorality of abortion. Mill describes (and criticizes) a
similar attitude in his essay, On Liberty:
It is the duty of governments, and of individuals, to form the truest
opinions they can; to form them carefully, and never impose them
upon others unless they are quite sure of being right. But when they
are sure (such reasoners may say), it is not conscientiousness but cow-
ardice to shrink from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrines
which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of mankind, either
in this life or in another, to be scattered abroad without restraint
102
Although one may agree fully with pro-life forces in the moral con-
demnation of abortion, it is not necessary to then agree that coercing
birth is the appropriate response. The perception of abortion as a harm
of the most abhorrent kind-equivalent to murdering a born human be-
ing-depends on religious or moral commitments 0 3 that emphasize the
role of human agency in conception and value the fetus as a developing
human being. Neither of these commitments can be coerced effectively;
they are only meaningful if produced by careful, individual reflection and
affirmation aided by private and public discussion. As Professor Mary
Segers writes: "[I]t is not a departure from the values of liberalism to
hold that individuals can be taught, encouraged, educated, exhorted,
urged, entreated, and persuaded-but not legally compelled-to use their
freedom (including reproductive freedom) wisely and with due care for
others."1o4
The withdrawal of pro-life views from the political arena probably
would not cause a revolution of moral consciousness and fewer abor-
tions. Individual agency means the freedom to make both wrong and
right choices. But individual agency also means that everyone recognizes
where full responsibility for wrong choices lies-with the individual.
As previously discussed, 0 5 attitudes of superiority, contempt, or
separation should not follow a judgment of right and wrong on the abor-
tion issue. After explaining and encouraging an anti-abortion position,
people who oppose abortion have "an obligation to respect the moral
autonomy of individual women regardless of their final decisions."10 6
102. J.S. MILL, supra note 22, at 87.
103. See R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 331; Abernethy, supra note 85, at 132; supra notes 82-
96.
104. Segers, supra note 5, at 251.
105. See supra text accompanying note 24.
106. Segers, supra note 5, at 251.
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B. Preventing Abortion Does More Than Prevent Harm
American law declines to coerce individuals into making substantial
sacrifices for others without sufficient evidence of a freely considered
commitment to make the sacrifices. Unless a statute creates an enforcea-
ble duty to care for another, none exists without the voluntary assump-
tion of a fiduciary or contractual relationship. In Jones v. United
States, 10 7 a woman who had complete custody of her friend's baby for
over ten months following the baby's birth was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter when the baby died of severe malnutrition and neglect.
The court of appeals overturned her conviction because the trial judge
had not instructed the jury that they must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mary Jones had a legal duty to supply food and necessities to
the infant.108 The court of appeals describes the circumstances under
which individuals may be held to a legal duty to care for others:
One can be held criminally liable: first, where a statute imposes a duty
to care for another; second, where one stands in a certain status rela-
tionship to another; third, where one has assumed a contractual duty
to care for another; and fourth, where one has voluntarily assumed the
care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others
from rendering aid. 109
Because no legal duty to aid others attaches without evidence of in-
dividual commitment, an individual can pass a stranger bleeding in the
gutter without lifting a finger to help and have committed no tort'10 or
punishable crime, even if that injured person dies. Government does not
fail to use political power to punish this kind of behavior because of un-
certainty about what the individual should do or because of a diversity of
opinions about whether the giving of aid is right. Almost everyone
would agree that right conduct for the person passing by would be to do
what ever she or he could to save the injured person's life. However,
107. 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962). I am indebted to Jay Brown's suggestions and the aid
of his paper, Emergency Aid as a Claim of Right: A Criticism of Criminal Good Samaritan Statutes
(1989) (unpublished manuscript available from the author), for the information regarding Good
Samaritan statutes included in this section. After completing this Note, I discovered an excellent
article discussing abortion restrictions as Good Samaritan laws. I recommend that much more thor-
ough discussion to the interested reader. Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MicH. L. REv.
1569 (1979).
108. Id. at 311.
109. Id. at 310.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 comment c (1965) ("[O]ne human being, seeing
a fellow man in dire peril, is under no legal obligation to aid him, but may sit on the dock, smoke his
cigar, and watch the other drown."). Two states, Vermont and Minnesota, have bypassed the com-
mon law with duty to aid statutes as follows: "A person who knows that another is exposed to grave
physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself
... give reasonable assistance to the exposed person .... VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 519 (1973); see
also MINN. STAT. § 604.05 (1988).
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recognition of the importance of individual agency in assuming responsi-
bility for others' welfare makes the futile nature of Good Samaritan laws
apparent."' If an unfeeling passer-by could escape without detection,
then she probably would, and a compassionate passer-by will act from
genuine concern not fear of punishment.
Even assuming the harm in abortion is as grave as the harm in mur-
der, one must recognize that preventing abortion involves much more
than preventing murder-it coerces substantial, prolonged sacrifices in
another's behalf." 2 A woman, in giving her body and its resources to the
development of another body, makes a sacrifice that takes its toll on her
physical, emotional, and often financial, health during pregnancy and af-
terward. If the mother alone or with the father 1 3 decides to keep the
child, then they assume life-spanning responsibility for someone else's
well-being to which they must attend regularly. The mother and father
may need to make substantial changes in their relationship to each other
and to others to meet this responsibility. Their sense of control over their
lives will be permanently affected. Future plans and goals for personal
development may be prolonged, if not permanently adjusted. If the op-
tion of adoption is available, and the parents choose to give up the baby
for adoption, they will probably feel emotional loss and perhaps guilt for
some time. Each parent may wonder for the rest of his or her life what
has become of the child. 114
111. See A.D. Woozley, 4 Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L.
REv. 1273, 1290 (1983) (four principled objections to Good Samaritan laws: "[1] concern with
selective enforcement of the law, [2] fear that a legal sanction diminishes the moral virtue of rescu-
ers, [3] concern with an infringement of civil liberties, and [4] fear of a 'slippery slope' once an
omission is treated as a criminal act").
112. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 375 ("Maternity, if chosen, is not servitude; it is in many
ways pleasant and satisfying, socially as well as personally. But it is at the same time a service that
every childbearing woman performs for others... that requires an irreducible physical burden: the
renunciation of bodily health and well-being for many months, perhaps with permanent physical
consequences .... "); Callahan, supra note 81, at 297 ("In all pro-life positions, the problem remains
that one is also going to inflict suffering by supporting the claims of the fetus to be protected by a
change in the law."); Segers, supra note 5, at 231-32.
113. Giving the woman full agency to abort or not requires that the father be given a fair oppor-
tunity to renounce his responsibility to the child either during the period when the woman can safely
abort or later when the baby can be adopted. As long as the woman has the choice to avoid parent-
ing, she cannot fairly strap him to that responsibility without similar deliberation and consent on his
part. If he does not consent, then the woman may still decide to give birth and have the baby
adopted or keep the child herself.
114. R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 346 ("The experience of going through a full-term preg-
nancy, bearing a child, and giving it up for adoption is punitive and traumatic for a woman because
the relationship by then is real; it exists."); Callahan, supra note 81, at 293 ("The sorrow of seeing
one's own flesh and blood, a family member, given away to outsiders and an unknown fate becomes
too hard to face.").
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Coercing birth resembles a Good Samaritan law, particularly when
safe, effective, relatively inexpensive means for terminating a pregnancy
exist as they do today in the United States. The majority in Roe v. Wade
were well aware of the burdens of childbirth when they decided abortion
could not be prevented appropriately with political power. 115 We simply
do not coerce that level of commitment to others. We rely on caring,
responsible impulses among people bound together by something other
than coercion to bring out the best in us.116
However, anti-abortion regulations differ from a Good Samaritan
law in some ways. Whereas an uncompassionate passer-by can avoid
helping an injured person by doing nothing, a pregnant woman must de-
stroy the fetus to avoid helping it. Also, a mother and father are directly
responsible for the fetus' existence, whereas a passer-by did not create the
injured individual. While these distinctions reinforce my conviction that
abortion is not morally justified, they fail to persuade me that a pregnant
woman should be forced to nourish the fetus.
Another natural objection to analogizing anti-abortion regulations
to Good Samaritan laws follows from the recognition that we use polit-
ical power to prevent or punish the abandonment or killing of a born
infant, without regard for the beliefs of the offender and whether our
actions will encourage or discourage a change in those beliefs. 117 All of
the observations about dependency, sacrifice, commitment, and the effect
of coercion that apply in discussions about unwanted pregnancies--ex-
cept for the peculiar physical symbiosis between woman and fetus in
pregnancy-apply to newborns and children. Yet none of us would say
that a parent should be allowed to resort to the "safe, effective and rela-
tively inexpensive" means of avoiding parental responsibility by aban-
doning or killing an infant.
115. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.... Maternity, or additional offspring, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental
and physical health may be taxed .... 1); cf Callahan, supra note 81, at 298 ("However, when
suffering cannot be relieved, or when it is freely taken on for the sake of others, the suffering will not
be meaningless for those who live in basic trust.") (emphasis added).
116. Segers, supra note 5, at 231.
117. Rosalind Petchesky suggests using the capacity for conscious individuation from others as a
moral touchstone to distinguish treatment of born infants from fetuses. R. PETCHESKY, supra note
5, at 345-47.
Justice Stevens wrote in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists:
[Ilt seems to me quite odd to argue that distinctions may not also be drawn between the
state interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting the
9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth. Recognition of this distinction is
supported not only by logic, but also by history and by our shared experiences.
476 U.S. 747, 779 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
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One important difference between responsibility to a born human
being and a fetus lies in the degree to which we can say the individual has
assumed responsibility for the other's welfare. Some pro-choice persons
believe that a conscious decision to continue a pregnancy, a choice more
dejiberate than simply conception, is required before a man and woman
become subject to an enforceable moral obligation. As Professor Lisa
Cahill describes, pro-life persons believe that conception brings with it
enforceable obligations to nurture the growing life:
Of particular relevance to the abortion dilemma is the fact that duties
or obligations can bind humans to their fellows in ways to which they
have not explicitly consented. Such obligations originate simply in the
sorts of reciprocal relatedness that constitute being human. The
mother-fetus relation is characterized by obligations of this sort, as are
all parent-child relations.1 18
Pro-life persons may retain the importance of consent in creating
legal obligations if they view the choice to engage in heterosexual rela-
tions as an assumption of possible parenting responsibilities. If the polit-
ical community protects fetal life with political power, as it does with
respect to born infants, then government sends a clear message to women
and men that whenever they have sex, they assume the risk of responsi-
bility for a third person's welfare. The political community sends the
message that because it values fetal life the same as a born human being,
the important choices regarding parenting concern when, with whom,
and under what life circumstances to have sex, not whether or not to
continue a pregnancy.
To most people who have a religious or moral commitment to re-
spect the role of human agency above the role of natural forces in con-
ception,1 19 this message is self-evident. 120 But the truth of the message
does not justify backing it with political power. To those who do not
profess a strong religious or moral commitment to the life-giving poten-
tial in sex, the message sounds tyrannical. It threatens grave penalties
for not changing their behavior about deeply intimate, life-spanning con-
cerns-sex and family-without respect for a voluntary process of
change in their attitudes. As Professor Virginia Abernethy posits:
In the "abortion debate," adherents of the right-to-life movement are
attempting to force the behavioral consequences of their beliefs on
others. The debate exists because a moral insight apparent to just a
118. Cahill, supra note 42, at 265.
119. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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portion of the citizenry has been infused into the political process and
is being proposed as the law of the land.121
As a political community, will we settle for right conduct on such
deeply significant matters or do we want individually chosen right con-
duct? If we prevent abortion with political power, undoubtedly some wo-
men will continue to exercise their individual agency and procure
abortions either at great financial cost or at great risk to their own lives
and health. 122 Undoubtedly, other women will not be able to pay the
price or will not take the risk, but instead will patiently or bitterly bear
the child they would have aborted. However, no woman will have the
opportunity to voluntarily reconsider whether they have assumed respon-
sibility to give the fetus life when they conceived the fetus. True, some
people might reconsider in spite of, or even because of, the coercion, but
many people will blame the coercive arm for the birth. 123 As a result, the
political community may have more infants born but will have sacrificed
the moral growth of individuals in the process.124
More important than utilitarian considerations for the good lost to
society in preventing abortion-perhaps as much can be said for the good
gained' 25 -is the false message sent to women with unwanted
pregnancies. Inappropriate external rewards or punishments mask the
truth about full individual responsibility for exercising or not exercising
121. Abernethy, supra note 85, at 133; see also R. PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 378 ("Control
over one's body... [is] a positive and necessary enabling condition for full human participation in
social and communal life.").
122. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3077-78 (1989) (Blackmun J.,
concurring and dissenting in part); Ooms, supra note 56, at 172-73.
123. See Ooms, supra note 56, at 173 ("The energies of the pro-choice movement would focus
entirely on challenging, disrupting, or disobeying the law.").
Professor Hart writes:
[T]here is very little evidence to support the idea that morality is best taught by fear of
legal punishment. Much morality is certainly taught and sustained without it, and where
morality is taught with it, there is the standing danger that fear of punishment may remain
the sole motive for conformity.
H.L.A. HART, supra note 39, at 58. But see Callahan, supra note 81, at 301 (role of the law in
educating and disciplining the emotions); supra note 25.
124. Segers, supra note 5, at 235 (We must have "a realistic sense of the limits of the criminal
sanction . . . [for] recriminalizing abortion will not achieve their intended effect of reducing the
incidence of abortion and will result in more harm than good."); see also R. PETCHESKY, supra note
5, at 350 ("[W]hat is going on here is a struggle, not over the contents of the womb, but over the
meaning of maternity and the competence of adult women to exercise judgment.").
125. The positive educational effect of the preventive laws on some, see M. GLENDON, supra
note 25, at 60, or the good saved in the lives of the born infants are possible examples of the good in
preventing abortion. For recognition of the harm done by present permissive abortion laws, see id.
at 34-35 ("filtered through the communications media to popular consciousness, the statement by
the highest court of the land that a fetus is not a 'person' has great potential for being misunder-
stood"); Ooms, supra note 56, at 172 ("[Uindoubtedly, such liberalization of the law did contribute
to the rise in the number and the rate of abortion and has changed attitudes even further.").
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the capacity to grow in wisdom, self-control, and love.126 But if an indi-
vidual is truly and fully responsible to her own conscience for her actions
on a particular matter, the most important effect among other effects of
right or wrong conduct will be internal. When the political community
refrains from imposing external punishments on the abortion issue, it al-
lows the truth about individual responsibility for morally good behavior
in sexual and family relations to become real and powerful in individual
lives.
Admittedly, the "individual responsibility" message subordinates
the effect of abortion on the fetus to the woman's moral choice. That is,
the message says that the political community values human agency on
the abortion issue, with its prize and price, more than it values fetal life.
I, for one, want the prize-full individual responsibility for family rela-
tionships with the moral development that individual responsibility
brings--enough to suffer the price-that sometimes individuals will set-
tle for less in their moral commitments and some fetuses will never be
born.
CONCLUSION
By refraining from using political coercion to prevent abortion,
those who find abortion abhorrent do not participate in the sin of those
who choose to abort. Rather, they make a judgment about the limits of
political coercion and our common commitment as a political commu-
nity, and about the extent of individual responsibility to conscience, to
others, and to God rather than to government. Making this judgment
enables pro-life advocates to commit themselves fully to the more diffi-
cult, but more worthwhile, task of winning hearts and minds to a better
way of life.
Some Supreme Court Justices have revived the question of which
government institution should make the judgment about the limits of
political coercion in regulating abortion. In Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, four Justices express with varying degrees of conviction
126. Although concluding that laws will aid rather than hinder the process, Sidney Callahan
recognizes the possibility for growth in wisdom, self-control, and love: "Educating and disciplining
the emotions are seen as necessary to character development, for emotional growth is possible. A
woman, for instance, who may not want a child can change her emotional reactions through reflec-
tion, self-mastery, and the power of love." Callahan, supra note 81, at 301; see also R. GRANT,
supra note 21, at 45-48 (describing Locke's understanding of individuals' ability to "educate their
desires" and "submit themselves to self-government" in the exercise of freedom).
Again, I emphasize that recognizing others' decision regarding abortion as wrong and damaging
to their moral growth does not justify stereotyping them as "careless, immoral, and selfish." See R.
PETCHESKY, supra note 5, at 370 (discussing inappropriate stereotyping of women who abort); see
also supra notes 24, 105-06 and accompanying text.
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their view that, contrary to the decision in Roe v. Wade, the state legisla-
tures and not the Supreme Court are the appropriate institutions to de-
cide the limits of abortion regulations. 127 Unlike the dissenting Justices,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy, and Scalia, sug-
gest (but do not expressly hold) that the Constitution does not put abor-
tion "beyond the reach of the democratic process."' 28
However, the fourteenth amendment, in combination with the char-
acteristics bestowed on the Supreme Court by article III of the Constitu-
tion 129 and the power bestowed by the tradition of judicial review,
requires the Court to assume watchdog responsibilities in the federal sys-
tem, ensuring that states do not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."' 30  While some commentators,
such as John Hart Ely, argue that "due process" means little more than
procedural fairness in the operations of democratic government,13 1 "lib-
erty" is more than a word in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment passed in 1868. Liberty, or individual agency, is one of the
"unalienable rights" for which early Americans fought and died in a
bloody revolution. They believed that "whenever any Form of Govern-
ment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to
alter or abolish it .... ,,132 Liberty is a foundation principle in our form
of government, a right we believe pre-exists government and survives its
abolition. Alexander Hamilton defended the judiciary created by article
III of the Constitution as a protector of liberty not only when faced with
a specific violation of the Constitution, but also when faced with "unjust
and partial laws."133 Justice Douglas quotes a 1905 Supreme Court case
127. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3040-58, 3064-67 (1989) (Rehn-
quist C.J., White, J., Kennedy, J.) (Scalia, J., concurring). For quotes of these Justices' opinions
regarding the importance of the legislative process on issues such as abortion, see supra note 17. The
dissenting Justices in Roe v. Wade express similar concerns about the relationship of the legislative
and judicial processes: "Mhe conscious weighing of competing factors that the Court's opinion
apparently substitutes for the established [rational relation] test is far more appropriate to a legisla-
tive judgment than to a judicial one." 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting) ("I find no constitutional warrant for imposing such an order of
priorities on the people and legislatures of the States.").
128. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058.
129. Article III grants life tenure and an undiminishable salary during their term in office to all
Supreme Court Justices, as well as to judges of the lower federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131. Ely, supra note 15, at 935 ("But 'due process' generally guarantees only that the inhibition
be procedurally fair and that it have some 'rational' connection-though plausible is probably a
better word-with a permissible government goal.").
132. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). For a longer inclusive quote from
the Declaration of Independence, see supra text accompanying note 25.
133. Hamilton argues:
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the independence of the
judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the
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suggesting a similar idea in his Roe concurrence: "There is, of course, a
sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own
will and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government, es-
pecially any free government existing under a written constitution, to in-
terfere with the exercise of that will."' 134 Recognizing the importance of
liberty does not answer immediately the question whether women ought
to be free to abort fetuses, but it does recommend greater consideration
of the implications of political coercion on the question than suggested
by a narrowly procedural interpretation of the due process clause.
James Madison expressed concern for the majority tyranny that can
result from the (albeit procedurally fair) operations of democratic gov-
ernment. In The Federalist No. 10, he recommends a large republic to
help alleviate the danger of majority tyranny. 135 Although a large repub-
lic may suffice to make majority tyranny difficult on the national level,
the lessons of slavery, civil war, segregation, and racial discrimination
demonstrate the dangers of majority tyranny on the state level. The four-
teenth amendment was passed in response to these crises, and should be
interpreted as conferring authority on the Supreme Court to prevent ma-
jority tyranny on the state level similar to its power to prevent majority
tyranny at the national level.1 36 Consequently, contrary to the plurality's
intimations in Webster, the Supreme Court has a duty to consider
whether state restrictions on abortion amount to majority tyranny.
The Supreme Court embraced that duty when in Roe v. Wade it
thoroughly considered and negatively answered the question whether
political power can be used appropriately to prevent abortion before fetal
viability. 137 Political power cannot appropriately be used to prevent
society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of the private rights of
particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of thejudicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the opera-
tion of such laws.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
134. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213-14 (1973) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 29 (1905)).
135. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
136. See supra text accompanying note 133. Robert Bork points out that "[m]ajority tyranny
occurs if legislation invades the areas properly left to individual freedom," whereas "[m]inority tyr-
anny occurs if the majority is prevented from ruling where its power is legitimate." Bork, Neutral
Ptinciples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971). Apparently, on the abor-
tion question some of the Justices fear minority tyranny at the hands of the Supreme Court more
than majority tyranny at the hands of state legislatures.
137. 410 U.S. 113, 159-60 (1973). For a more thorough discussion of the legitimacy of Roe's
constitutional grounding, see Ely, supra note 15 (bad decision without adequate constitutional
grounding), and Laurence Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973) (although Roe has its problems, it is a step in the right direction).
See also Walter Dellinger & Gene Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat From Roe
v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. RaV. 83 (1989) (Webster discounts Roe's principles without adequate expla-
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harms that without moral or religious commitments are not perceived as
harms.1 38 Further, even if all agreed that abortion causes a harm similar
to murder, coercing involuntary sacrifices for others of the magnitude
involved in a nine-month pregnancy has no precedent in our society. 139
The choice to adhere to the principle that sexual relations entail the risk
of parenting obligations is a value judgment that requires individual re-
flection and moral commitment. Women should not be coerced into as-
suming the responsibility of giving birth to children if they reject the
value judgment that enjoying sexual intimacy necessarily brings with it
that potential responsibility. 140 With these minor adjustments in the
analysis, the decision in Roe is mandated by our structurally limited
form of government 41 and is enforced appropriately by the Supreme
Court against the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
Kimberly Sharron Dunn
nation); William Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of ConstitutionalReviewfrom Griswold v. Connect-
icut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677
(responding to Dellinger and Sperling's defense of Roe as a necessary extension of Griswold).
138. See supra notes 82-104 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
141. Although he may not consider the analysis convincing, John Hart Ely suggested that the
"system of government contemplated by the Constitution" might support a "constitutional right to
an abortion" when he pointed out that the Court did not make use of that justification in Roe, as it
had when it recognized a fundamental right to interstate travel. Ely, supra note 15, at 927-28.
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